Rescuing Democracy in the United Kingdom from our current Elected Dictatorship

 

WWW silentmajorityspeaks.com

This week, a poll found most Britons believe that Tony Blair lied over weapons of mass destruction. But as this devastating report by hugely respected Panorama journalist makes clear, new questions about No. 10 and the 'truth' are even more disturbing .....

by John Ware, BBC Panorama Reporter, whose recent programme ' A Failure of Intelligence' examined the intelligence data Mr Blair relied upon. - Daily Mail, July 22, 2004.

Before the Iraq war, Tony Blair explained that he published his Iraq dossier in September 2002 because the intelligence picture on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction was becoming more and more frightening. "There was," he told the Hutton Inquiry, "a tremendous amount of information and evidence coming across my desk."

But after the war, when the intelligence picture began to fall apaart because it was unreliable, the Prime Minister claims to have been told very little. Ealier this year, he said he never knew until after the war that the dossier's headline claim - that Saddam could deploy his WMD in 45 minutes - related only to battlefield weapons like mortars and shells, rather than missiles that could strike British bases in Cyprus.

Now Mr Blair is saying that he knew nothing about the withdrawal, one year ago, of the intelligence that underpinned his dossier's second headline claim: that the intelligence showed 'beyond doubt' that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical and biological weapons. Downing Street said last week that Mr Blair only got to hear about this 'as a result of the Butler Inquiry'. The Butler Inquiry began sitting in early February 2004, so the Prime Minister is saying that at least six months - and perhaps more - passed before he was told. Is this not astonishing?

Certainly, all the senior officials close to No 10 must surely have known about the withdrawal of intelligence: John Scarlett, the JIC chairman; Sir David Ormand, the Security and Intelligence co-ordinator; Sir Richard Dearlove, head of Secret Intelligence Service; and MPs on the Intelligence and Security Committee which report to the Prime Minister.

And now the Foreign secretary, Jack Straw, has admitted that he knew as long ago as last September. Are we really to believe that those in the Prime Minister's office were the only ones out of the loop?

It seems incredible that Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair's chief of staff, would not have been told. He is very much a 'details' man. Nothing of any importance escaped his eagle eye when the dossier was being put together. Is it likely that it did when the dossier began to fall apart?

Downing Street insists that there is nothing at all odd about the Prime Minister not knowing the intelligence had been withdrawn. It was 'just one element of the CBW (chemical and biological weapons) picture, not the only one', his official spokesman has said. Yet, like the 45 minute claim, this intelligence was no ordinary 'element'. Indeed, it had been presented to Mr Blair and his then director of communications Alastair Campbell by 'C' - chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Richard Dearlove - at the same time one of Mr Campbell's staff was complaining the first draft of the dossier was 'intelligence lite'.

On September 12, 2002, Sir Richard Dearlove briefed Blair, Campbell, Powell and the Prime Minister's foreign affairs and defence adviser, Sir David Manning, about SIS's five main sources in Iraq. They were told that two of these sources were new and one of whom appeared to hold out great promise. This source was said to have good 'access' (presumably to the Iraqi hierarchy) and was reporting that production of chemical and biological agent had been accelerated.

To be fair, Sir Richard did add a health warning, explaining that 'the case was developmental and the source remained unproven'. So Mr Blair and Mr Campbell could have been in no doubt that what was on offer fell well short of anything resembling hard evidence, and one might reasonably have expected both men to pepper the foreword to the dossier they were about to write with caveats and qualifications. But they didn't. Caveats and qualifications were largely ignored.

Four days later, Mr Scarlett hardened up the dossier's Executive Summary from saying that there 'probably' had been recent production of chemical and biological agent to an assertion: 'Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological agents'.

Bur Mr Blair went one notch further. Commenting on the intelligence sources, his first draft of the foreword said: "What I believe they established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons." Perhaps this explains why, around this time, Mr Blair is reported to have said to Sir Richard one evening in Downing Street: 'My fate is in your hands, Richard.' It was said laughingly, but today it's no longer a joke.

It was this crucial piece of intelligence which led, more than anything, to the deep feeling of disquiet within one branch of the intelligence services, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), The DIS are Whitehall's top WMD analysts. A team led by Dr Brian Jones was helping to put together the picture from the different fragments of intelligence coming in from Iraq. They were struck by just how sparse the intelligence was. They had analysed the '45 minute' intelligence and were unconvinced.

As Dr Jones told BBC Panorama recently, it was 'transparently light'. There was an 'absence' of firm intelligencce on the productionof chemical weapons. "If agents haven't been produced for these weapons then you coundn't use a weapon within 45 minutes, could you?" he said.

But Dr Jones's team was being told by SIS, and those drafting the dossier, that this new intelligence would dispel their doubts.. Except they would have to take this on trust They were not allowed to see it in order to test its credibility because the new source was too 'sensitive'. Dr Jones checked with a trusted colleague who had seen the intelligence. The colleague told him it would not convince him that Saddam was making war-fare agents to deploy in 45 minutes.

So Dr Jones and his chemical weapons expert both put their concerns on the record that the dossier was going beyond what they believed the intelligence could support. On June 4, in the aftermath of the furore caused by Andrew Gilligan's ill-judged broadcast, Mr Blair told Parliament it was 'completely and totally untrue' that there had been 'disquiet in the intelligence community who disagreed' with the inclusion of the 45 minute claim in the dossier.

This was true - but only in a strictly limited sense. While Dr Jones's team had objected to the strength of the wording of the claim, he was not objecting to some reference to it but he did want it to be heavily caveated.

So Mr Blair's categorical denial was short of the whole truth. It was an answer he could defend - if ever he had to - whilst still conveying the clear impression that there was not a scintilla of truth in anything Andrew Gilligan had broadcast. As Mr Campbell's diary later revealed, he wanted to 'f**k Gilligan'. There were to be no concessions whatever to the BBC, even though some of what Gilligan had broadcast was true. 'I wanted a clear win, not a messy draw,' wrote Campbell.

And yet by July 2003 it had begun to look as if a clear win might be difficult. The intelligence picture was starting to unravel. The SIS was now on the ground in Iraq amd had beem 'validating' its five main sources on which the dossier's major claims were based. It had found what they believed to be the original source for the intelligence that had been explained personally by 'C' to Mr Blair - and which had persuaded him to declare the overall credibility of the intelligence as being beyond doubt - but which was also withheld from the experts led by Dr Jones. Yet this 'source' denied to SIS's validators 'ever having provided the information' in the first place.

There was worse. Jack Straw had just told the Foreign Affairs Committee that there had been no formal complaints from members of the intelligence services about the content of the dossier. The Foreign Secretary had inadvertently misled them. He presumably had not know that Dr Jones and his colleague had written formal letters. Now retired, Dr Jones had written to his old office at the Defence Intelligence Staff that he was not to blame for Parliament being misled.

In addition, the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon was about to be questioned by MPs on the Intelligence and Security Committee about whether personnel had complained about misuse of intelligence. At the same time the Prime Minister was preparing for a trip to Wahsington where he was to be the first British Prime Minister since Winston Churchill to be awarded the American Congressional Gold Medal of Honour for supporting the US in Iraq.

On the afternoon of July 17, 2003, John Scarlett and the deputy chief of Defence Intelligence meet in Sir David Omand's office - presumably to decide how to manage what had all the potential of a major crisis. As the meeting got under way, by cruel irony, Dr David Kelly, who had been Gilligan's source, had just killed himself - or was about to.

Following the meeting, the threat posed by a crumbling intelligence picture to the high moral ground staked out by No 10 in its titanic battle with the BBC, was finessed away.

First, Mr Hoon was advised to tell the ISC nothing about the letters written by Dr Jones or his colleague, or to disclose their identities. It was suggested he say only that there had been a 'considerable debate' about the 'precise language' of the dossier - in which the DIS had been heavily involved - and that this was healthy and normal. The fact that two senior and highly respected intelligence analysts had submitted formal minutes meant that the 'debate' had been anything but normal.

Second, Dearlove informed the Intelligence and Security commitee that the intelligence Dr Jones had been so doubtful about was being withdrawn because it was judged so unreliable. But he made it a condition that they should not disclose it in their report which was to be published. The ISC acquiesced because Dearlove told them the matter was still operationally sensitive. Yet 12 days later the intelligence was officially with-drawn - two weeks before the ISC report went to the printers. It's hard to see why the fact - that the main plank underpinning Mr Blair's assertion that the intellligence was 'beyond doubt' had collapsed - could not have been shared with the public.

It is clear from the transcripts of the evidence from government officials, the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary, that the line they were going to take at the Inquiry was very carefully prepared. Vital intelligence that was so discredited and which had been withdrawn was nevertheless referrred to approvingly by several government witnesses - even though Dearlove and others knew that it no longer buttressed the dossier's main assertions.

Did no one inform the Prime Minister's office, before Blair took the witness stand, how the intelligence case was starting to collapse? If this was not done before his evidence to Hutton, is it not extraordinary that it was not done afterwards? Especially in the light of the Foreign Secretary's admission this week that he personally was informed midway through Hutton.

On May 25 this year (2004) the Prime Minister was still swearing by all the intelligence. He told a press conference: "I personally believe that the intelligence we received was accurate. I have said that to you all along."

I find this very perplexing. By May, much of Whitehall knew it had been withdrawn and that SIS's post-war validation had raised serious doubts about the dossier's 45 minute headline claim - as indeed did I. Are we seriously expected to believe that no one in Mr Blair's office knew that either? Didn't anyone tell him?

What the Prime Minister's office didn't know and when they didn't know it has reached the outer limits of credibility.

***********************************

Before you vote please read Michael Howard's challenge to Tony Blair in the House of Commons on the day the Butler report was published, and the latest news on John Scarlett. A devastating report by hugely respected BBC Panorama journalist, John Ware, raises new questions about No. 10 and the 'truth', which are even more disturbing. Also read Rifkind on Blair and a letter from one of the normally silent majority in the United Kingdom.

The candidates could be asked if their own views and that of their Party manifesto corresponded with the polls, and if not, how they intended to represent the will of the majority of local voters.  Local and National Press, Radio and TV coverage would be arranged and the results published on this web site.

Here is another powerful strategy for using your vote effectively in the forthcoming General Election. Send your sitting and prospective MPs a letter defining your requirements if they want your vote. This example deals with the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty.

Your letters would end: "If you do not answer this letter, I shall take it that you intend to follow the Government line. I shall act accordingly in the forthcoming General Election."

Blair's defiance of the will of the majority of we, the people of the UK, over the invasion of Iraq must be exposed by voters as a matter or urgency, and not just in the two by-elections we have had this July and the European elections in June 2004. But how can this be done?

The most effective way of getting our deceitful PM to resign would be to mobilise the army of Labour MPs currently in the House of Commons and get them to demand it, the loss of their seat to be a penalty if they did not. All voters in Labour-held constituencies need to write a letter along these lines to their local Labour MPs:

Here's one to get Tony Blair to resign:

Dear Despite his absolute and unequivocal assurances over the past year of the serious risk to our security of Saddam Hussein's 'weapons of mass destruction', Prime Minister Blair has admitted, that the threat was non-existent. For that critical error of judgement and for his gross incompetence in handling this very important issue, I ask you to take immediate steps to ensure that Tony Blair does the honourable thing and resign without delay.. I would therefore be much obliged if you would propose and help mobilise a Parliamentary vote of 'No Confidence' in Mr Blair which, despite Labour's huge majority, would leave the PM with no option but to resign. If I get no reply to this letter, I shall assume you will continue to support Mr Blair as our Prime Minister. In such circumstances I shall not vote for you in the forthcoming General Election. Signed:

Simple, non-violent, protest letters along these lines on a variety of issues could be the basis for re-vitalising our democracy and increasing voters' interest and participation in politics. Download a printable copy of the above letter here.

Or why not create a questionnaire that you send to all the candidates in your constituency, getting them to give yes/no answers to questions of your choice, and ending it with the same paragraph(above).

Download a printable example of the questionnaire.

It is high time for the people of this United Kingdom to stop allowing themselves to be manipulated by politicians. We need our representatives in Parliament to genuinely reflect the view of the majority in their own constituency, even if this means going against their personal and/or their party's policy. While they may argue their case, hoping to change the minds of the majority in their constituency, they should ultimately be obliged to reflect the majority view of those who elect them. 

It will be argued by politicians of all parties that most voters don't have the knowledge necessary to express an opinion on important subjects at issue, and that our vote is a form of delegated democracy. We should argue that it is their duty to ensure that we voters do have ready access to such information as is necessary to form an intelligent opinion. That, after all, is one main purpose of Opposition Parties in our Parliamentary Democracy.

Most important of all, such proceedings would rekindle in voters their latent interest and obligation to cast their vote, knowing that the candidate of their choice would be more likely to act in accordance with their wishes. A much higher turnout in elections would be the result.

Contact your local Party Chairman. Gain his support for setting up public forums in your constituency on these, as well as any other relevant topics, well before the next General Election expected in 2005. You should then, depending on the integrity of the candidate of your choice, feel fairly certain that your view on any subject being debated in Parliament will more accurately be reflected by your representative in that assembly.

 

If you have suggestions for additional subjects, or material to include in the pages linked to the subjects listed, please contact the webmaster.